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Abstract
This paper evaluates the impact of credit availability on communal and commercial sector
maize output in Zimbabwe. This is important given the increased use of concessionary credit
for agriculture as a policy strategy to increase agricultural output and food security, in response
to the disruption caused by controversial land reform. The results show that communal sector
maize output does not respond to credit availability. Neither does it respond to area under
cultivation. Rainfall is the single most important driver of communal agriculture. The com-
mercial sector responds to credit incentives albeit with a very low elasticity. Therefore, credit
availability is a rather impotent device for enhancing maize output and, generally, agricultural
output in Zimbabwe. Since most of the newly resettled farmers typically operate like communal
farmers, both the land reform programme and concessionary credit for agriculture will not be
likely to increase agricultural output. An urgent review of the bene￿ciaries of the controversial
land reform programme is needed to ensure that only pro￿t maximizing farmers will have their
landownership con￿rmed, while unproductive farmers are replaced, if the agricultural sector is
to help revive the Zimbabwean economy. Thus, commercialisation ￿rather than communalisa-
tion ￿of the agricultural sector is the appropriate strategy to trigger an increased agricultural
output response.
KEYWORDS: ARDL approach to cointegration, credit, maize output response, Zimbabwe
1 Introduction
Theory is inconclusive about the impact of credit on agricultural output. On the one hand, it is
argued that liquidity constraints reduce agricultural output. On the other hand, it is argued that
liquidity constraints are not binding if agricultural productivity is already low. This paper evaluates
the impact of credit availability on communal and commercial farmers producing maize in Zimbabwe.
Modern agricultural systems are capital intensive. Agricultural credit is argued to be an impor-
tant vehicle for agricultural development because it helps farmers cope with the capital demands
required to boost production levels. The continuous change in prices of inputs required in agricul-
tural production is among the major problems that farmers face each year. Inputs include seed,
fertilizers, chemicals, labour and transport. Availability of credit makes it easier for farmers to
acquire the necessary inputs. In order to enhance utilization of credit by farmers, most governments
in developing countries have even introduced subsidized credit.
However, some argue that liquidity constraints are not binding if agricultural productivity is
already low. For instance, low levels of ￿xed capital, infrastructure and working capital are expected
to reduce the impact of credit on the productivity of communal farmers (Kochar 1997). Furthermore,
if the marginal product of capital is less than the cost of credit, then credit constraints are not
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1binding. This is likely to be the case with communal farmers who might have limited access to land,
or use primitive production techniques, or are late adopters of technology.
The impact of credit availability on agricultural output is thus an empirical question. The
Zimbabwean government holds the view that credit availability increases agricultural productivity.
They have been using concessionary credit to enhance agricultural production in the hope that it will
counter the disruption caused by the controversial fast-track land reform programme of 2000 The
fast-track land reform programme removed white large-scale commercial farmers from their land and
resettled the farms with black farmers who were severely undercapitalized and new to commercial
farming. These new, undercapitalized farmers were expected to produce agricultural output for the
country
In order to assist the new, undercapitalized farmers, the Zimbabwean government sought loans
from Iran, Egypt, Malaysia and China for the purchase of equipment such as tractors and combined
harvesters (Rukuni et al. 2006). The equipment was distributed to farmers on loan. In 2001
the government introduced the Crop and Livestock Inputs Scheme, to assist smallholder farmers.
Smallholder farmers are termed thus because they own and farm no more than 30 hectares of land.
Under this scheme, smallholder farmers were given inputs on loan, to be paid back at harvest, through
a stop order system through the agricultural marketing boards. Even recently, the government has
been distributing inputs in the form of seeds, fertilizers, chemicals, tillage services, and loans for
labour hire, etc.
These government-supported credit schemes are meant to promote the growing of all major food
crops and cash crops, and also encourage restocking of livestock. It is still to be investigated whether
these schemes are e⁄ective or not, but statistics show that some farmers are not using the disbursed
funds or input packs for the intended objectives. Every year, at most two-thirds of the targeted
acreage is planted and less than a third of the total funds disbursed has been recovered (Ministry
of Agriculture 2004). The government is striving to provide the new farmers with credit to enable
them to secure the same resources and equipment similar to those that displaced commercial farmers
were using. However, it is not clear whether credit availability is the appropriate intervention. It is
important to establish whether credit potentially does play any pivotal role in production levels of
communal and commercial farmers in Zimbabwe.
In particular, given that the fast-track land reform had the e⁄ect of communalizing the agri-
cultural sector, it would be bene￿cial to know (i) whether communal farmers respond to credit
incentives i.e. will concessionary ￿nancing of agriculture increase agricultural production by the
new farmers, the majority of whom are essentially communal farmers and (ii) whether the respon-
siveness of communal farmers is any di⁄erent from that of commercial farmers i.e. is there a need
for institutional change in agriculture in favor of moving to some mode of production. These are
particularly relevant questions given that discussions on the impact of credit presume use of mar-
keted inputs to produce marketed output by a pro￿t-maximizing farmer. Such assumptions may not
exactly ￿t the pro￿le of the smallholder farmer (i.e. communal farmers and other farmers resettled
under the A1 resettlement scheme - a scheme to decongest the communal areas) who are largely
subsistence farmers. Moreover, since the fast-track land reform, marketing of agricultural produce
has been controlled in both movement and price, such that the marginal revenue product of capital
in agriculture could be less than the cost of credit and returns from alternative investments. When
these factors are taken into consideration, doubt is cast on the responsiveness of communal farmers
to credit availability.
This paper therefore seeks to answer the following questions: (1) Are communal farmers re-
sponsive to credit? (2) Is their response similar to that of commercial farmers? These questions
are answered using time series data from Zimbabwe for the period 1980-2001 to estimate the re-
sponsiveness of both communal and commercial farmers￿maize output to credit and other factors.
The rest of the paper provides background information on the structure of the agricultural sector
in Zimbabwe, outlines the methodology used in the paper, presents the results of the econometric
analysis, and ￿nally summarizes the conclusions and policy implications.
22 Background
2.1 The dual structure of the agricultural sector
Zimbabwe has a total land area of about 39 million hectares, of which 33.3 million hectares are
suitable for agricultural purposes, and the remaining 6 million hectares have been reserved for
national parks, wildlife reserves and urban settlements. The country ￿rst became a political entity
as Rhodesia, under British in￿ uence, towards the end of the 19th century. The Republic of Zimbabwe
attained independence from Britain on 18 April 1980, after 15 years of international ostracism and
economic sanctions, and a protracted civil war. At independence, agricultural land was divided along
racial lines as follows: (i) about 15.5 million hectares, which is almost half the total agricultural
land in the country, controlled by 6,000 white large-scale commercial farmers, and (ii) about 16.4
million hectares controlled by 840,000 black communal farmers. Consequently there was signi￿cant
over-crowding on land occupied by communal farmers. This uneven land distribution between the
large-scale commercial and small-scale communal areas also extended to the suitability of land for
agricultural purposes ￿communal farming land was generally less fertile. Communal farmers in
general, also lacked, good husbandry skills, and had poor agricultural and physical infrastructure
(Von Blanckenburg 1994).
In an e⁄ort to redress the inherited imbalance of land distribution, the Zimbabwean government,
in 1980, embarked on a resettlement programme. Land acquisition proceeded in the spirit of the 1979
Lancaster House Constitution￿ s ￿willing seller, willing buyer￿clause, which was not allowed to be
changed for ten years from its inception. The targeted bene￿ciaries were people in communal areas,
war-displaced people, and Zimbabwean refugees. 162,000 families were to be resettled on 3.5 million
hectares of land, of which 0.5 million hectares was former state land in the large and small-scale
commercial farming sectors. As a result of the resettlement programme, about 73,000 families were
resettled. By the late 1980s, the land distribution pattern was as follows: (i) 1.4 million hectares
was owned by 10,000 small-scale commercial farmers, (ii) 11 million hectares of land was owned by
the large-scale commercial farmers, (iii) 0.5 million hectares was owned by the state farming sector,
(iv) about 16.4 million hectares was controlled by one million communal farmers, and (v) 3.5 million
hectares was controlled by about 73,000 resettled families. In spite of the progress made, there was
still a huge demand for land among the congested communal farmers and other landless groups,
with over 524,890 families awaiting resettlement.
Most commercial farmers were plainly unwilling to sell any land because, among other factors,
they could not repatriate all proceeds from the sale of land due to foreign exchange controls, while
others overpriced their land twice or thrice over. The government was powerless in the face of the
farmers￿resistance because of the ￿willing seller, willing buyer￿clause, so they enacted the Land
Acquisition Act of 1992. The Act removed the ￿willing seller, willing buyer￿clause, which resulted
in speeding up the land reform process. The Act empowered the government to buy land any
land for redistribution, and compensation was to be paid for the acquired land. Landowners were
given the right to take the matter to court if they did not agree with the compensation set by the
government. Britain had, from the onset of the resettlement programme, been a partner with the
Zimbabwean government, and had agreed to fund 50% of the land purchases, contributing about £44
million. In an apparent protest to the Act, Britain withdrew her aid to the resettlement programme,
accusing the Zimbabwean government of giving the land exclusively to high ranking government
and ruling party o¢ cials. The Act had a limited impact largely because the government, without
Britain￿ s assistance, did not have the money to compensate landowners, and most compulsory land
acquisitions were contested in court.
In 1998 the government made a decision to compulsorily purchase ￿ve million hectares of land
over ￿ve years as part of the resettlement programme. Land was to be identi￿ed on the basis of
the following criteria: (i) under utilization, (ii) dereliction, (iii) multiple ownership, (iv) absentee
ownership, and (v) proximity to congested communal areas. Farmers owning 841 farms were served
3with acquisition orders, but the government failed to process the compensation within the legally
stipulated time. As a result land reverted back to its owners. The Commercial Farmers Union,
an organisation that represents, protects and advances the interests of commercial farmers and fur-
thers the development of an economically viable and sustainable agricultural industry in Zimbabwe,
subsequently o⁄ered 1.5 million hectares of land from its members for sale to the government for
redistribution.
The resettlement programme had to move on but landowners once again dragged their feet in
o⁄ering more land to the government. As frustration set in on both sides, in 2000, the government
drafted a new Constitution of Zimbabwe with a clause to compulsorily acquire land for redistribution
without paying compensation, except with respect to improvements made on the land. The proposed
Constitution of Zimbabwe failed to win by 55% of the votes in a referendum. Immediately after
the defeat of the proposed Constitution of Zimbabwe, the government quickly moved to amend the
old Constitution of Zimbabwe and the Land Acquisition Act of 1992 with a clause to compulsorily
acquire land for redistribution without paying compensation, except with respect to improvements
made on the land. Following that amendment, a long list of farms became the initial target for
a new mode of acquisition where compensation was to be only paid with respect to improvements
made on the land, rather than for the land itself. This, coupled with decisive demonstrations by
the Zimbabwe liberation war veterans and the land-hungry peasants who spontaneously occupied
commercial farms throughout the country, caused a huge outcry in the country and internationally.
Under the fast-track land reform, the A1 scheme of land allocation was earmarked for communal
farmers while the new commercial farmers were resettled under the A2 scheme - a scheme to create
a new generation of commercial farmers. However because of lack of capital and poor allocation
criteria most of these new commercial farmers operate like communal farmers.
By mid November 2001, about 160,000 families had been resettled on 3,074 previously large-
scale commercial farms covering about 7.3 million hectares (UNDP 2002). Land reform was then
announced completed in August 2002 (Chiremba and Masters 2003). Government reports indicated
that the government acquired close to 10 million hectares of land and more than 352,000 families
were resettled, with priority given to people who were living in congested rural areas. Aggregate
agricultural output scaled down by approximately 50% and about 200,000 farm jobs were reported
lost in 2002. Zimbabwe￿ s food security and foreign currency earnings were negatively a⁄ected by the
decline in agricultural output.
Until the fast-track land reform, the most outstanding characteristic of the agricultural sector in
Zimbabwe was dualism. With dualism, the state supported the commercial farming sector, which
possessed the most fertile land, and which had access to national and international markets, credit,
technology, extension services, manufactured inputs, and consumption goods (Makandiwire and
Bourenane 1987). Commercial farmers work mostly with horticulture and intensive crop production
of maize, tobacco and soya beans, using mechanised production techniques (Rukuni and Eicher
1994). They hire labour, sometimes from communal farmers in peak periods. Commercial farmers
have an advantage over smallholder farmers when it comes to accessing bank loans because they
have collateral. They use earnings from their sales to increase their investments on their farms,
potentially resulting in better yields in each successive production year.
With dualism, the communal farmers were ￿settled on poor and small portions of land, produc-
ing mainly for family consumption and local markets, were denied equal education and employment
opportunities and even salaries for the same job di⁄ered with race￿(Von Blanckenburg 1994). Com-
munal farmers are self employed and generally involved in subsistence farming in crop and livestock
production. Crop production is mainly for food consumption, and the surplus is marketed. Major
crops grown in the smallholder farming sector are maize (dominant food crop), sorghum, millet,
groundnuts and sun￿ ower. Crop production is not mechanized. Livestock provides animal draught
for tillage, transport and manure. It also serves as a stock of wealth, and provides some income as
well as food (i.e. milk and meat). Over the years, poverty levels among the communal sector have
been increasing. This has been attributed to poor farming systems, low land holdings and a poor
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2.2 The agricultural output trends
The contribution of communal farmers to the country￿ s aggregate crop production is generally smaller
than that of commercial farmers as shown in Figure 1. On average they contribute only 20% to
the total crop production. However, communal farmers are the highest producers of food grains,
such as maize, although their yield per hectare is lower than that of the commercial farmers. The
commercial farmers dominate the production of cash crops. The commodity, technological and scale
bias in the communal and commercial farming sectors is closely related to the di⁄erences in capital
ownership and farming techniques employed by the two farming sectors.
The communal sector￿ s contribution to total crop production reached its peak of over 30% in
1985. Since then, it has been falling, except for 1993 and 1995. This peak occurred at about the
same time that ￿nancial support reached its peak, both in absolute amounts and share of total loans,
as well as the number of farmers supported.
The same trend is observed with the real value of gross agricultural output for the two sectors,
as shown in Figure 2 below. In the early years after independence until 1985 there was a general
increase in communal sector output, after which a general decline is observed. The year 1992 is
exceptional in that the massive drop in output was due to a severe drought. Nonetheless, the real
value of gross communal output levels has been below that of 1985. On the other hand, save for
three years from 1987 to 1989 and the severe 1992 drought, the real value of gross commercial
output increased until 1996. Clearly, the response of the commercial sector to incentives appears to
be di⁄erent from that of the communal sector.
2.3 The evolution of agricultural credit support
The trend of credit support for agriculture shows that over the years, commercial farmers have
always bene￿ted more than communal farmers, as illustrated by Figure 3 below.
This trend can be traced to the country￿ s history. The history of agricultural credit in colonial
Zimbabwe goes back to 1924 when the Land and Agricultural Bank of Southern Rhodesia was set
up for the purposes of granting loans to white commercial farmers. Since then, a number of state
sources of agricultural credit were made available to assist white commercial farmers, among them
the African Loan Development Company Limited formed in 1961, and the Agricultural Loan Fund
formed in 1964 (Rukuni et al. 2006). The Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) was then formed
in 1971 as a successor to the Land and Agricultural Bank of Southern Rhodesia, with its major
function being the granting of medium- and long-term loans at low interest rates (Makandawire and
Bourenane 1987). It absorbed the Farm Irrigation Fund, the Agricultural Diversi￿cation Scheme,
the Tenant Farming Scheme, the Co⁄ee Scheme, and the Land Owners Development Loan Scheme,
which were set up in the 1960s as supporting bodies for white commercial farmers.
Until independence in 1980, the ￿nancial services available to communal farmers were restricted
to deposits and withdrawals only. As a way to complement the resettlement programme after inde-
pendence, the Zimbabwean government introduced some ￿nancial support services for the communal
sector which was previously serviced by mostly non-governmental or church organizations. The AFC
also opened its doors to the smallholder farmers. In the 1980/81 agricultural season, 18,000 loans
amounting to Z$4.8million were disbursed to smallholder farmers (Rukuni et al. 2006). Other
sources of credit for smallholder farmers after independence were the Small Enterprises Develop-
ment Corporation, and informal loans and savings schemes such as the Association of Women￿ s
Clubs and Rotating Savings Credit Association.
Despite the policy changes, the participation of smallholder farmers in accessing loans was not
satisfactory. According to Chimedza (1993), in 1989 only 16.5% of all building society outlets were
located in communal lands where 70% of the country￿ s total population resided. The AFC was the
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to meet demand in the rural areas, servicing less than 10% of smallholder farmers in 1986. By 1990,
the ￿gure was less than 5% of the total smallholder farmers (Makandawire and Bourenane 1987).
AFC was operating as a parastatal, and dependent on the government for its ￿nancing. Between
1981 and 1991, its major obligation was to disburse loans at a subsidized interest rate of 13% while
the in￿ ation rate was 15% or more per year, causing huge losses for the corporation (Rukuni et al.
2006). According to an AFC income statement, the corporation was losing Z$0.16 on each dollar
lent to communal farmers, while lending to commercial farmers yielded Z$0.07 pro￿t on each dollar
lent in the 1989/1990 season (Rukuni et al. 2006). Most of the loans granted to commercial farmers
where medium- and long-term, allowing them to invest in machinery and also cater for variable
costs. On the contrary, loans granted to smallholder farmers were mostly short-term, and hence
were mostly used for variable costs and immediate expenses.
Although AFC increased its disbursements over the ten year period (1981-1991), with a peak in
1986 where 65,269 farmers bene￿ted, only 10% of these farmers were smallholder farmers (Rukuni
et al. 2006). From 1986 onwards, the number started declining, with major declines being observed
among the smallholder farmers. The major reasons for the decline included poor repayment perfor-
mance and dissatisfaction with the management of the stop-order repayment system. The communal
farmers￿explanation for the decline was the high demands of the loans associated with high appli-
cation failure rates (totalling about 40% of applications) and higher transaction costs (Rukuni et al.
2006). In an e⁄ort to reach more smallholder farmers, the corporation launched the group lending
pilot programme in the 1990 agricultural season.
In 1999 the AFC was transformed into two entities ￿Agribank, a commercial bank, and the Agri-
cultural Development Assistance Fund (ADAF), a special fund, Agribank was to cater for commercial
farmers while ADAF was to cater for smallholder farmers. ADAF is yet to develop a sustainable
rural ￿nancial system. Under ADAF, an increase in demand for credit by the smallholder farmers
has been observed although there are still problems with satisfying their demands. The traditional
banking requirement of requesting collateral cannot be applied to smallholder farmers, but the farm-
ers must show proof of savings in lieu of collateral. Some smallholder farmers are still not able to
meet this requirement. The slow transition of the bank led the government to introduce funding
through the Ministry of Agriculture working with the Ministry of Finance as a way of boosting
agriculture output.
However, it is worth noting that there was a steep drop in loans for the communal sector in 1997,
accompanied by a further steep drop in both the communal and commercial sector in 2000, soon
after the fast-track land reform programme.
3 Theoretical Framework
The theory of the ￿rm implicitly assumes the absence of liquidity constraints. When applied to
agricultural production, this implies that production decisions will be independent of consumption
decisions (Feder et al. 1990) so that input demands are always optimal. On the contrary, in
communal sector agriculture, production and consumption are intertwined with the consequence
that the amounts and combinations of inputs used by a communal farmer will deviate from their
optimal levels when liquidity constraints are binding.
A theoretical link between credit availability and communal farmers￿productivity is provided
in a model of household consumption and investment by Feder et al. (1990). In this model, the
household allocates resources at its disposal between current consumption, investment and purchase
of variable inputs at the beginning of each production period. The household￿ s initial endowments
of resources, both liquid and illiquid (family labor, capital and land) resources, can be augmented
by borrowing at the beginning of the period. Expenditure on current consumption, investment and
variable inputs should equal the household￿ s total amount of resources (which includes borrowing).
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tion, and the valuation of capital), subject to the constraints imposed by the production function,
budget constraint and capital accumulation. Two situations arise. In the ￿rst situation, the house-
hold is not credit-constrained such that the ￿rst order condition for the variable input equates
marginal productivity to cost. There is separation between consumption and production decisions.
In the second situation, the household is credit-constrained such that both investment and vari-
able input demands are also functions of the household utility parameters. This implies that credit
constraints deviate (reduce) input demand from their optimal levels, hence a⁄ecting productivity.
Furthermore, comparative statics results show that an increase in credit will be split between pro-
duction and consumption (Feder et al. 1990). In this case, the production function incorporates
credit availability as an argument as opposed to the ￿rst case where there is separation between
production and consumption decisions.
The speci￿cation of the production function generally follows past studies (Feder et al. 1990,
Kochar 1997), which used the theoretical framework summarised above. In these models, the reduced
form production model is estimated as a function of labour, land, other variable inputs, and the
amount of credit available. A key implicit assumption of our analysis, which will allow us to capture
the impact of credit, is that capital stock will be purchased mostly using credit, thus replacing the
capital stock variable with the credit availability (loans) variable in the production function.
4 Methodology
4.1 Data
The paper￿ s primary interest is the response of communal farmers￿maize output to credit availabil-
ity, and compares it to the response of commercial farmers￿maize output to credit availability, in
Zimbabwe. The paper uses time-series data from 1980 to 2001 for the Zimbabwean communal and
commercial sectors, obtained from the Central Statistical O¢ ce￿ s Compendium of Statistics 2000,
the Quarterly Digest of Statistics 2004, and the Government of Zimbabwe￿ s Agricultural Sector of
Zimbabwe Statistical Bulletin 2001. Rather than investigate the responsiveness of the aggregate sec-
toral agricultural output, the paper estimates the responsiveness of maize output of both communal
farmers and commercial farmers to credit availability. In other words, aggregate sectoral agricultural
output is proxied by aggregate maize output (production) for each sector. This choice is motivated
by three factors: ￿rstly, there is a need to use a common output for the two sectors; secondly, maize
production contributes over 90% of the total production in the smallholder sector; and ￿nally, maize
is essential for Zimbabwe￿ s food security.
The explanatory variables chosen include credit availability (loans), employment (labour), area
under cultivation, and rainfall. Data for employment in communal agriculture is not available
therefore the communal population is used as a proxy. This is appropriate since communal farmers
predominantly use family labour. The size of the rural population is a good indicator of the amount
of labour available for use in maize production. However, it should be noted that this implicitly
assumes a constant dependency ratio over time. There is neither reason nor evidence to doubt that
the dependency ratio in rural areas might have been constant over the period under analysis.
4.2 Estimation Technique
The paper uses the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach to cointegration proposed by
Pesaran et al. (2001) to estimate the responsiveness of communal and commercial sector maize
production to credit availability.1 Maize output is regressed as a function of labour, rainfall, area
1Readers requiring a more detailed explanation of the cointegration approach are referred to time series textbooks
such as Enders, W. (1995). Applied Econometric Time Series, John Wiley & Sons, USA and Charemza, W. W. and
D. F. Deadman (1997). New Directions in Econometric Practice: General to Speci￿c Modelling, Cointegration and
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signi￿cant estimation problems when using time series data. Firstly, this approach captures both
short-run and long-run dynamics when testing for the existence of cointegration. Secondly, it permits
the estimation of cointegration relationships when variables are I(0), I(1) or a mixture of the two,
hence there is no need to pretest for the order of integration of the variables in the model. Thirdly,
it o⁄ers explicit tests for the existence of a unique cointegration vector rather than assuming one.
Finally, it takes into account the possibility of reverse causality (i.e. the presence of some explanatory
variables that are endogenous, or the absence of weak exogeneity of the regressors) thereby ensuring
that the parameter estimates are e¢ cient and consequently valid.
These features are very important in an analysis where a priori, an important variable such as
rainfall is likely to be stationary but will then need to be analysed alongside other variables that are
non-stationary. Also, in this framework, credit availability (loans) is a policy variable that enhances
agricultural output but could itself be a response to low agricultural output levels, hence endogenous.
The empirical application of the ARDL involves three steps: (i) identifying the order of inte-
gration of variables using the unit root tests; (ii) testing for the existence of a unique cointegrating
equation using the bounds testing approach; and (iii) estimation of the ARDL to obtain the short-run
and long-run coe¢ cients.
5 Results
5.1 Unit root tests
The unit root tests are based on the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips-Peron tests.
The ADF results are reported in the table below alongside the Phillips-Peron test.
The unit root tests for the communal sector presented in Table 1 above show that output and
rainfall are stationary, while area under cultivation is I(1). However credit availability is I(1) from
the Phillips-Peron tests as opposed to the conclusion from the ADF test that its ￿rst di⁄erence is
non-stationary. Credit availability to the communal sector has structural breaks (see year 1997 in
￿gure 3) as such the ADF overestimates the order of integration for this variable. Accordingly, we
go by the result from the Phillips-Peron test indicating that credit availability is I(1). Unit root
test results for the commercial sector presented in Table 2 show that maize output and labour are
stationary while credit availability and area under cultivation are I(1). Thus for both sectors, the
data is a mixture of I(1) and I(0) variables. We thus proceed by means of the bounds test for
cointegration.
5.2 Bounds tests for cointegration
This test is used to identify the cointegrating vectors in the system by testing for the exclusion of the
error correction term in the equation of interest. Let us consider the application to the estimation
of response of maize output to credit availability. As mentioned above, output (Qt) is a function of
labour (Lt), credit availability (Ct), rainfall (Rt) and area under cultivation (At). De￿ne the error
correction term as
ECT = Qt￿1 ￿ ^ ￿1Lt￿1 ￿ ^ ￿2At￿1 ￿ ^ ￿2Rt￿1 ￿ ^ ￿3Ct￿1 (1)
The ARDL representation is thus
















+￿1Qt￿1 + ￿2Lt￿1 + ￿3At￿1 + ￿4Rt￿1 + ￿5Ct￿1 + "t (2)
Vector Autoregression, 2nd Edition, Edward Elgar, UK. For the ARDL approach see Pesaran et al. (2001).
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the coe¢ cients of the lagged variables in equation (2) should be jointly signi￿cant. Thus the null
hypothesis in the bounds test is H0 : ￿1 = ￿2 = ￿3 = ￿4 = ￿5 = 0 against the alternative hypothesis
that at least one ￿i 6= 0. Rejection of the null hypothesis implies the existence of a cointegrating
vector while failure to reject the null hypothesis is an indication that there is no cointegration.
This procedure is repeated on all variables in the system (except for those assumed to be weakly
exogenous). In this paper, only rainfall is assumed to be weakly exogenous. Thus, one estimates
equation (2) four times, each time using one of the variables in the system as the dependent variable.
A unique cointegrating vector exists if the null hypothesis is not rejected for all but one estimated
equation.
The test statistic for the null hypothesis is the Wald statistic or the F-statistic. However, their
asymptotic distribution, which depends on the dimension and cointegration rank of the forcing
variables, is non-standard. Pesaran et al. 2001 consider two polar cases, (i) when all the variables
are integrated of order zero and (ii) when all variables are integrated of order one. They generate two
sets of critical values for the F-statistic, the lower bound corresponding to the case where all variables
are I(0)and the upper bound corresponding to the case where all variables are I(1). These provide
critical value bounds for all possible classi￿cations into I(0); I(1)and mutually cointegrated processes.
If the F-statistic is below the lower bound, it can be concluded that there is no cointegration, and if
the F-statistic is above the upper bound, it can be concluded that there is cointegration. However,
inference would be inconclusive when the F-statistic falls within these bounds. Thus, knowledge of
the cointegration rank of the forcing variables is required to proceed further.
Narayan (2005) however argues that critical values generated by Pesaran et al. (2001) cannot
be used in small samples since they are based on large samples. Narayan (2005) then compares the
critical values generated from smaller samples of 30 to 80 observations using the same gauss code
as Pesaran et al. (2001) and ￿nds that Pesaran et al. (2001) critical values are generally smaller
than critical values generated from a small sample. Hence Narayan (2005) argues against the use of
these critical values in small samples, and provides critical values for 30 to 80 observations for use
in small samples. The bounds test results for both communal and commercial sectors are shown in
Table 3 below.
The cointegration test results show the existence of a unique cointegrating vector for the com-
mercial sector at the 5% level of signi￿cance. This cointegrating vector is normalized on output. In
comparison, the cointegration test results only show the existence of a unique cointegrating vector
for the communal sector at the 10% level of signi￿cance. The unique cointegrating vector is also
normalized on output. On this basis, the ARDL estimation on the communal sector is carried out
and then compared to the results obtained from the ARDL estimation for the commercial sector.
5.3 Estimation of the ARDL of the communal and commercial sectors
The table below presents the results for the long-run ARDL estimation for the two sectors.
An ARDL estimation of the responsiveness of communal sector maize production to credit avail-
ability shows that communal farmers are not responsive to credit incentives. This is indicated by
an insigni￿cant long-run coe¢ cient of loans in Table 4. In contrast, there is a signi￿cant long-run
response by the commercial sector maize producers to credit incentives, although the response is
inelastic.
There are two possible explanations for the lack of signi￿cance of the communal sector output
response to credit availability. Firstly, communal production is characterised by a combination of low
soil fertility and primitive production techniques which results in the credit constraint not binding.
Secondly, when the liquidity constraint is binding, additional liquidity is shared between purchase
of variable inputs and current consumption, implying that an elastic response of communal output
to credit availability would only be observed if the output elasticity with respect to the variable
input is highly elastic. The ￿rst explanation seems more plausible because productivity, measured
9by yield per hectare, is very low for communal farmers. Moreover, the share of marketed variable
inputs in maize production is low, hence liquidity constraints may not be binding. In the event that
liquidity constraints are expected to bind, they may be eased by remittances from family members
and relatives in urban areas.
In the long run, the only signi￿cant determinant of communal sector output is rainfall with an
elasticity of 1.79. To enhance communal agriculture, without any institutional change, the empha-
sis should rather be on water provision i.e. investments in dam construction and supplementary
irrigation.
As shown in Table 5, the error correction term is signi￿cant for both sectors. However, in both
cases, it is negative and greater than one, indicating an oscillating adjustment to equilibrium. Table
6 shows the ARDL coe¢ cients alongside the LM tests for serial correlation. The p-values for the
LM statistic are 0.34 and 0.49 for the communal and commercial sectors respectively. Thus, the
diagnostic statistics indicate no serial correlation for both sectors. The results are also free from the
problem of heteroscedasticity.
In short, the results conclude that communal farmers do not respond to credit availability while
commercial farmers do respond to credit availability. However, the commercial sector￿ s response is
inelastic. This result means that credit availability is an impotent device for enhancing agricultural
output in Zimbabwe. The immediate implication is that the massive credit incentives, which are
being considered by the government to stimulate agricultural production by the newly resettled
farmers, are not likely to trigger an increase in maize production since most of the resettled farmers
(i.e. A1 farmers and a majority of A2 farmers) typically operate like communal farmers.
Furthermore, for the communal sector, output is not responsive to area under cultivation hence
ceteris paribus the land allocations under the A1 scheme are not likely to increase maize production
by the communal sector.
However, the signi￿cant output response to area under cultivation and credit availability by the
commercial sector implies that credit incentives may work for pro￿t-maximising, newly resettled A2
farmers. The key factor for credit incentives to be e⁄ective thus lies in channelling credit to pro￿t-
maximising farmers. This requires careful screening of credit recipients and design of incentive-
compatible ￿nancial support, otherwise extending credit to all farmers alike will not be e⁄ective.
The results show that there is a need for a careful review of the bene￿ciaries of the controversial
fast-track land reform programme in Zimbabwe to ensure that only farmers who operate in a pro￿t
maximising framework will keep their land. In future stages of land reform, farmers who do not
produce pro￿t should be replaced with farmers who do, if Zimbabwe is to satisfy its food security
and, possibly, reclaim its former position as the breadbasket of southern Africa.
6 Conclusion and policy implication
The major conclusion drawn from the above analysis is that unlike the commercial sector, communal
sector maize production does not respond to credit incentives. Nevertheless, although signi￿cant,
the response of the commercial sector is inelastic. Another major conclusion is that communal
maize output is also non-responsive to area under cultivation. The results therefore imply that a
huge increase in concessionary provision of credit that started in 2004, and is set to continue, is a
futile exercise if all else remains equal, because it will have little or no impact on maize production.
Indeed, maize production in particular, and agricultural output in general, has not risen in tandem
with credit availability. Furthermore, giving communal farmers more land does not appear to in-
crease maize production and consequently agricultural output at all. Thus commercialisation of the
agricultural sector seems to be the ￿rst appropriate strategy to trigger increased maize production
and consequently agricultural output response to credit availability. As things stand, rainfall is
the single most important driver of communal agriculture and, without any institutional change,
the emphasis should rather be on water provision i.e. investments in dam construction and sup-
10plementary irrigation. In the future, there is a need for a careful review of the bene￿ciaries of the
controversial fast-track land reform programme to ensure that only those farmers who operate in the
pro￿t-maximising framework will have their landownership con￿rmed, and unproductive farmers be
replaced with more productive ones in the future stages of land reform if Zimbabwe is to enhance
its food security and, possibly, reclaim its position as the breadbasket of southern Africa.
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Table 1: Unit root tests for the communal sector 
 
 










Output -4.690814** -3.012363     
Labour 4.332207  -3.644963  -5.188825**  -3.658446 
Loans








Area under cultivation  -2.794064  -3.012363  -5.890654**  -1.959071 
Rainfall -3.918067** -3.012363     
     **    Variable is stationary at 5% level of significance 












13Table 2: Unit root tests for the commercial sector 
 










Output -6.217325** -3.658446     
Labour -4.262725** -3.098896     
Loans* 1.437298  -3.658446  -4.870467**  -3.658446 
Area  under  cultivation  -0.785343 -1.958088  -4.9232** -1.959071 
Rainfall  See Communal Sector 
     **    Variable is Stationery at 5% level of significance 
 
 
Table 3: Testing for a unique cointegrating vector – the Bounds test results 
 
 
  Dependant 
Variable
 











d  6.6008** 0.52869  1.23100  0.29036 
**There is cointegration at 5% Level of Significance;* There is Cointegration at 10% Level of 
Significance 
a.  Specification includes intercept, no trend 
b.  Specification includes intercept and trend 
c.  The critical values for case of unrestricted intercept and restricted trend for  k=5 are Lower Bound 
I(0)– 3.504; Upper Bound I(1)– 4.743 using Narayan (2005) Critical Values at 5% LOS. The 
Pesaran-Shin-Smith Critical Values for intercept and trend are I(0) – 3.189; I(1) – 4.329 at 5% LOS; 
I(0) – 2.722; I(1) – 3.827 at 10% LOS   
d.  The critical values for case of intercept and no trend for  k=5 are I(0)– 3.504; I(1)– 4.743 using 
Narayan (2005) critical values at 5% LOS. The Pesaran-Shin-Smith Critical Values for intercept and 
no trend are I(0) – 2.649; I(1) – 3.805 at 5% LOS; I(0) – 2.262; I(1) – 3.367 at 10% LOS   
 
Table 4: Long-run estimates 
 
Communal Sector  Commercial Sector  Variable 
Coefficient  Std Error  Coefficient  Std Error 
Loans -0.35478  0.36070  0.31260**  0.10194 
Labour 0.9121E-6  0.16319E-5  -1.4203***  0.36291 
Area  under  cultivation  2.2906 1.6319 0.82191**  0.27042 
Rainfall 1.7886***  0.51144  0.54859  0.38077 
C -33.6499  26.3448  14.3291  7.7551 
Trend -0.048148  0.29354     






14Table 5: Error correction representation 
 
 Communal  Sector 
ARDL(1,1,1,1,1) 
Commercial Sector 
ARDL(2, 1, 1, 0, 2) 
Variable  Coefficient  Std Error  Coefficient  Std Error 
D(Output,1)    0.51827***  0.12649 
D(loan) -0.47904  0.26858  -0.41731***  0.19760 
D(Labour) 0.1640E-4
a  0.9916E-5   4.9972*  1.4253 
D(Area) 2.9137*  1.3717  0.98287***  0.22230 
D(Rainfall) 1.3600***  0.44668  -0.59637***  0.15861 
D(Rainfall,1)      -0.62179**  0.23878 
C -41.8717  35.1740  17.1353  11.4577 
dTrend 0.059912  3.36901     
ECM -1.2443***  0.33788  -1.1958***  0.21158 
Adjusted R
2  0.76298 0.881 
F –stat  12.3968[0.000] 21.5241[0.000] 
***Significant at 1% level of significance (L.O.S); **Significant at 5% LOS; *Significant at 10% L.O.S  
 
Table 6: ARDL representation 
 
 Communal  Sector 
ARDL(1,1,1,1,1) 
Commercial Sector 
ARDL(2, 1, 1, 0, 2) 
Variable  Coefficient  Std Error  Coefficient  Std Error 
Output (-1)  -0.24433  0.33788  0.32243*  0.14862 
Output  (-2)    -0.51827**  0.12649 
Loan -0.47904  0.26258  -0.41731*  0.19760 
Loan(-1) 0.037574  0.32760  0.79113**  0.2734 
Labour 0.1640E-4
a  0.9916E-5 4.9972***  1.4253 
Labour(-1)    -6.69556***  1.2388 
Area 2.9137*  1.3717  0.98287***  0.22230 
Area(-1) -0.063414  1.6833     
Rainfall 1.3600**  0.0446  -0.59637***  0.15861 
Rainfall(-1)  0.86567 0.74440 0.63061** 0.17900 
Rainfall(-2)    0.62179  0.23878 
C -41.8717  35.1740  17.1353  11.4577 
Trend -0.059912  0.36901     
Adjusted R
2  0.49082 0.84970 
LM Serial Correlation Test  0.88304[0.347] 0.47289[0.492] 
DW-statistic  1.7471 1.7454 
F –stat  2.9279[0.053] 11.7413[0.001] 
***Significant at 1% level of significance (L.O.S); **Significant at 5% LOS; *Significant at 10% L.O.S  
a.   Communal Labour is in its levels not natural logs 
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